



in context. Page numbers, in brackets, are to the previously published text.]

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STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM P. BUNDY, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND ABRAM CHAYES, LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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REAFFIRMING THE COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF HEMISPHERE
[P. 32]

It is, I think, also possible in such a resolution to reaffirm soberly our sense of the inter-American commitment to the security of the hemisphere. I would hope, sir, we could do that without, at the moment under the present stage of negotiations, appearing to draw the other members of the hemisphere into precisely detailed actions at this juncture.

We expect about October 2, about 2 weeks' time to have an informal meeting of the foreign ministers of the hemisphere. We do expect to discuss there what further steps can be taken in the hemisphere with respect to the Cuban question.

Now, we do believe that certain of the countries that showed some reluctance at Punta del Este to take the strongest possible line toward Cuba have been showing some movement; the very shipment of Soviet arms to Cuba beginning in July has caused them some deep concern. I say this on the assumption that, Mr. Chairman, this is an executive session and I could be consulted if there were any intent to make the record public.

Chairman RUSSELL. We intend to have this record sanitized and printed. We would hope the State Department would be very frank with us but we intend to authorize you and the Department of Defense to go through it to eliminate any matter that might be detrimental.

Secretary Rusk. I would appreciate that, Mr. Chairman, because we do feel that in Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, there has been some significant movement in recent weeks on this question. We would like to have the opportunity to work with them further between now and October 2, and indeed for a period after October 2, without in a sense scaring them away at this moment or making the possibility of their governments moving with the rest of the hemisphere more difficult because of the resistances that might be built up domestically in their country before we can get their governments to move on the matter.

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DIPLOMATIC PRESENTATIONS TO NATO AND OAS MEMBERS [P. 38]

Secretary Rusk. We have taken up the question with other governments in NATO. We have made a very strong case on the security aspects of the Cuban problem as it affects us and the preoccupation of the American people with this issue and we have asked

them to consider urgently what steps they can take with respect to their ships, flagships, in the Cuban trade.

Also I think it is correct to say we have been very strongly supported in those efforts by the known concern of the public opinion here and the Congress with respect to NATO flagships. I suspect the very fact they have accepted the preoccupation of the American people with this issue has greatly reinforced and helped our diplomatic effort.

The principal difficulty about this is that, so far as we can learn, practically no ships are chartered for the Cuba trade. They are chartered on a bare bottom, long-term basis, maybe some of them running as far as 5 years, to, say, the Soviet Union. If these ships, for some reason, were to be drawn out of the Cuba trade but remained chartered to the Soviet Union, then the Soviet bloc would divert its shipping into the Cuba trade and use these chartered ships for intra-bloc shipping so this is immediately involved with the problem of almost a total economic break with the Soviet bloc and Western Europe.

Now, there we get into another type of problem, and that is that in connection with the Berlin issue we have laid elaborate plans in NATO for the imposition of economic measures at a very early stage of the harassment of our position in Berlin, which would, at a certain stage, amount to a total break of this sort with the Soviet bloc. Since July, since these shipments to Cuba have greatly stepped up the problem and the concern about it, this question has not been directly related yet to the contingency planning with respect to Berlin.

But even so, and I will have to delete this from the record at some stage later, the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, has just informed us that they are moving immediately to stop whatever ships they can stop under existing law, and are considering asking the Bundestag for additional legislation to stop further flagships, German flag ships, in the Cuban trade.

We know that the British and the Norwegians are reviewing this urgently at the present time. You perhaps saw the press report that an Italian ship did not sail today because its crew would not take it into the Cuban trade.

SHIPS INVOLVED IN CUBAN TRADE

In other words, this idea is making some headway. I would add, however, two things which are not fully helpful, but help to this extent: We have not yet been able to determine that any NATO flagship is involved in arms and munitions of war so far as Cuba is concerned; and second, we have not found any American-owned ships under Liberian or Panamanian charter engaged in the Cuban trade. In other words, we are trying to close in on this from every direction.

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean in the Cuban trade or carrying arms and ammunition?

Secretary RUSK. No, in the Cuban trade, American-owned ships under the Liberian flag.

Chairman RUSSELL. I had read in the press where ships both under Panamanian and Liberian registry had gone into the Cuban trade.

Secretary RUSK. We inquired into that some time ago and our best information now is there is no American-owned ship under Liberian or Panamanian flag engaged in that trade.

I might also inform the committees we are now making a detailed examination of the actual ships and the actual lines that have ships in the Cuban trade so we would know exactly who they are and how they relate to general free world trade and what measure might be available short of formal government action in those cases where the governments are unable or unwilling to take action against them.

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STIFFENING LATIN AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD CUBA [P. 40]

Secretary RUSK. There has been some change in opinion which was the trend followed at Punta del Este. Of course, the attitude of the Argentine Government is significant with the overthrow of Frondizi. We just heard this morning that General [Amaury] Kruel has just been named minister of war in Brazil in the caretaker government there to last until the plebiscite next spring, and he is well known as a staunch anti-Communist, pro-American, pro-Western Hemisphere individual. We feel that is an encouraging sign. We also know that Mexico is much more concerned about this than she was in January of this year, for example. So we are hopeful there that some movement, some further movement, can in fact be reported and some further action be taken.

QUALITY OF INFORMATION ABOUT CUBA

Chairman RUSSELL. What do you think about the quality of the information we have about what is really taking place inside Cuba? We have been deceived in that area before; we were before the invasion. I just wondered if we have improved our means of getting information in Cuba on which we could risk the security of this country.

Secretary RUSK. I think that this varies somewhat with the type of information. In connection with such things as missile sites, for example, the ground-to-air, anti-aircraft missiles, in that we do have very firm information indeed, and of a most reliable sort.

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean as to the nature and the capacity of the sites?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, I think we have very good information on that. I am not at liberty to indicate exactly how, but I am myself fully confident we have very good information on that, sir.

In terms of political information, we do need to get more than we do. We get a good deal from the refugees who continue to come out. We get a good deal from the diplomatic missions of those countries that still have embassies in Havana, who have been very cooperative in passing on information that they get, that is for the most part. There are certain ones that don't, such as the Swiss, who are handling our affairs there and have to be very careful about that.

We do not have as much information as we should like about the political attitudes and the effect upon the Cuban people of the stringencies which they have been facing to an increasing degree in the last several months.

Actually, agent-type of intelligence is difficult. The apparatus of control is pretty persuasive there, so there are types of information which we need to find ways to improve, if possible. But on a strictly military side, I think we have quite firm information on the specific elements of armaments that are going in there.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't like to get in too deeply in this because I realize it is a sensitive area.

SOVIET SPECIALISTS IN CUBA

On what do you base your conclusions that there are more agricultural specialists than missile specialists from Russia to Cuba? That struck me, I read somewhere or we heard, that there were more agricultural specialists than military specialists. I just wondered on what base you reached that conclusion?

Secretary RUSK. I believe, sir, there recently has been—was a statement in the Tass statement. I think the figures on specialists, Mr. Bundy, did you have the latest figures on that?

Mr. BUNDY. The figures, Senator, are that approximately 1,700 Soviet military people came in late July and early August and another 1,000 since then. That is about 2,700, pretty clearly identified and counted at least as to order of magnitude. Prior to that influx there were about 500 military technicians. Economic specialists were considered by the intelligence people to be several thousand in number. My own guess at this point—I haven't checked the point in the last 2 or 3 days—would be probably 50-50 at this point between economic and military people.

Chairman RUSSELL. How can we determine what he is doing, Mr. Bundy? We get such scanty information over there. How can we tell whether he is teaching them to build a power line or whether he is teaching them to engage a radar set so as to fire missiles against the United States?

Mr. BUNDY. I don't think we can be sure of that, Senator. I am afraid I will have to put on my old hat—I used to be in CIA—but you can tell a good deal about the nature of the people they associate them with, whether you see them in association with the military, but I am sure it is not an exact demarcation.

CAN THE UNITED STATES ASSIST OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE? [P. 51]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I merely use the example of Guatemala. Suppose the Guatemalan Government said officially, "Look, we think we are about to be put upon here. Would you send some ships down here to help us out?"

Secretary RUSK. I think we have gone somewhat beyond that, Senator, because we have undertaken active cooperation with all of these governments, with the possible exception of Mexico, on just

the kind of surveillance and preparations that you are now talking about.

For example, there was a report, and this will have to be taken off the record, that there was a ship leaving Cuba for one of these Caribbean countries. We had the most intimate cooperation with the country involved and prepared to take whatever action was necessary to catch it, seize it. Whether the report was inaccurate or whether they heard about the preparations and, therefore, called it off, I don't know. The ship didn't in fact turn up as we had expected, but we had the total cooperation of the government concerned in that and we had no question about the rights.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

SITUATION IN THE CARIBBEAN [P. 63]

Secretary RUSK. Senator, on the first part of your question, your comment about the effect of the worldwide confrontation with the Soviet bloc, I can comment briefly on that. I did comment on that before you came in.

Senator HUMPHREY. I will read the record.

Secretary RUSK. But I will comment on that further later on this afternoon. There are a number of things that are being done to try to encourage people inside Cuba. How much I cannot say. I would like to get some advice on it.

UTILIZATION OF CUBAN EXILES

The various refugee groups at the moment are not able, because of a disagreement with each other rather than agreeing on a single unified consistent effort, to get all of their activities coordinated. There are some that I think we have very close relations with; others we do not have as close relations with.

Some of these refugees, of course, are being offered places in our own Armed Forces where they can play a very useful role in some stage. Others have been picked up by some of the other Caribbean countries.

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AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: From the Committee on Armed Services: Senators Russell (presiding), Thurmond, Engle, Bush, and Beall.

From the Committee on Foreign Relations: Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Church, and Aiken

Senator RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

Senator Bush?

Senator BUSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, has our government made any request of the Soviet Government for a demand or warning of the Soviet Government that they should discontinue this military buildup in Cuba?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM P. BUNDY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND ABRAM CHAYES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we know that the Soviet Government fully understands the attitude of the U.S. Government on this matter. This has been conveyed to them in a variety of ways. But we have not formally presented them with a note or formally proposed any discussion or negotiation on that subject. The reason for that is that we believe very strongly the Soviet Government would attempt, if we opened up the question on that basis, to link this with other situations in other parts of the world as a matter of organic discussion; they would attempt to link it with our own allies, with the situation in Turkey, for example. In their Tass statement they attempted to draw some connection between Cuba and a considerable number of arrangements which we have with other countries.

We feel it is very important for us to maintain the view that this is a special problem in this hemisphere and is not to be tied for purposes of discussion, negotiation, possible deals, with situations in other parts of the world.

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PUBLIC INFORMATION ON EXTENT OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO CUBA
[P. 65]

Secretary RUSK. The President has included information on this in his statements and has included that if the situation changes we will make further information available. We are working on a more detailed statement of the sort that might, under the right circumstances, be used as sort of a white paper or more extensive information over a period of time.

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DOES UNITED STATES HAVE RIGHT TO RESTORE CUBA TO A GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE [P. 68]

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. The question was asked you this morning about our sources of information. My recollection is that you said we did have sources of information that you think are absolutely reliable; isn't that right?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. And the information the President has given to the country has been based upon information obtained from those sources?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. And now I have heard and seen in the press different statements about the number of missile bases and things of that kind. I do not believe that has been made public, has it, by the President?

Secretary RUSK. Has the actual number been made public?

Mr. BUNDY. I think not.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I do not think it has.

Mr. BUNDY. It has been revealed to both of these committees and to the House committees.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Yes I know that. But the point I am trying to make is, I am not trying to get numbers on the record. There may be reasons why it might be not good to have it, and there may be reasons why it may be good to have it there.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. But the estimate that has been made, and the information that has been given various committees of Congress by the President and by the military and by the CIA and by you, the Department of State, all of that has been based upon this information from these reliable sources?

Secretary RUSK. Which is on those subjects and can be exceedingly accurate.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. There are other questions of judgment.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I am not asking you about those, but I am just asking about the accuracy, for instance, of the number of missile bases.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. The number of torpedo boats.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. And things of that kind in which you have a definite count; isn't that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Now, I said this morning I hoped there would be some testimony by the military. The two of you are at the table together, and you can certainly give this, and that is with reference to those missile sites. I have heard the statement made, over the radio last night, for instance that these sites could be readily converted into IRBM sites or sites for long distance—I count the IRBM as long-distance, I am not talking about the ICBM—long distance missiles.

I want to ask you is that true or not?

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I know that in the briefing at the White House at which the President and the Secretary of State and the Deputy Director of the CIA all joined in the briefing, I remember distinctly or I have the distinct impression in my mind that these sites could not be usable in their present shape nor readily convertible for land-to-land use missiles.

Mr. BUNDY. That is my understanding, Senator, and I would like to check that.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. And it would take considerable effort either to convert them or to build new ones, and it would be such effort as could be easily discovered and learned of through the same sources of information.

Secretary RUSK. The configuration of the sites, or a very typical configuration for a particular type missile or missiles themselves, certain ones of them were easily identified.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Is the range of these missiles a matter of secrecy or has that been made public?

Mr. BUNDY. No, that has been made public in the President's statement, Senator.

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SUPPORT OF STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION BY DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT [P. 73]

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Bundy, do you have any statement you desire to make on this matter?

Mr. BUNDY. No, sir. I came purely to respond to any questions the committees might have on matters of a military nature, the military situation. The Department of Defense fully supports the statement Secretary Rusk has made, and the position he has presented.

Senator BUSH. I have one question, Mr. Bundy.

Chairman RUSSELL. YES.

Senator BUSH. Mr. Bundy, you were in the CIA for many years, I know. Do you feel that these estimates we have about the number of men and the amount of military equipment and all that is going in there, has gone in there, is based on hard intelligence that is absolutely reliable?

Mr. BUNDY. I have not been behind all of this, Senator, but I am certainly prepared to take the rating of the professionals whom I got to know as individuals, and this is a high level intelligence. I have not the precise report on which these figures were constructed. A good deal of it, of course, comes in through the refugees, Senator, and has to be sifted by those who know who is a good informant and those who are not, and I assume that to be done by a very competent professional man.

Senator BUSH. I do not want to ask an inappropriate question, but I want to know about how we get this information. Do we have hard intelligence that was generated over there by our own people?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, on that question this varies with the category of information.

On the question of the nose count of Soviet bloc personnel, we get that from a variety of sources, but we do find a consistency that points, I think, quite reliably to the figures we are talking about.

On certain other kinds of information, the missile sites or the motor torpedo boats, we have information of the highest possible reliability.

Senator BUSH. Thank you.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Let me ask this question, Mr. Bundy.

Mr. Bundy, with reference to those sites, you have had an estimate of the situation from our own defense forces, and they know pretty well the degree of the task that it would be if they were called upon to knock them out, have you not?

Mr. BUNDY. Yes, sir. We would not in the normal course of events fail to keep completely up-to-date contingency plans based on and revised more or less constantly as information of this sort becomes available.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I remember General [Curtis] LeMay, Chief of the Air Force, stating that there would be no difficulty in knocking out those missile sites.

Mr. BUNDY. That is correct, Senator. This particular missile has a mean range; that is, a range below which it is ineffective, a range of 2,500 feet altitude, and below that you can go in the back and they cannot do anything to you.

Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I remember hearing General LeMay say it would be a rather easy thing to knock them out, knock them all out. Of course, those are things I do not know that the public should know, but I do feel that it is always reassuring to know that our people are on the alert regarding those things and do keep their plans ready and are sizing up the situation.

Senator BUSH. May I ask one more question? If you want this answer off the record, you think it should be answered off the record, you may answer it off the record. Do we know of any movement by the Cuban refugees to organize an attempted invasion of Cuba that is going on at the present time?

Secretary Rusk. There are various groups, Senator, undertaking various tasks pointing in that direction. But I would not be able to say today that there is a large group of refugees preparing to take on this job on a scale which would insure its success by Cuban efforts alone. In other words, if this reaches an effort where military action is required, I think it would involve necessarily U.S. Armed Forces.

Senator BUSH. I think the President said in his statement last week we would encourage such activity, is that not so?

Secretary Rusk. Well, we want to encourage Cubans, both inside and outside of Cuba—and outside Cuba in this country and outside Cuba in other countries—as well as everybody else in this hemisphere, to keep concentrating on the problem of the liberation of Cuba.

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the committee adjourned.]